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CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES: GIVING TORT CLAIMANTS A
VOICE IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY CASES
ABSTRACT
Over the years, tort claimants have increasingly appeared in the
bankruptcies of corporate debtors. More so than other participants in
bankruptcy proceedings, tort claimants are brought into this forum
involuntarily. Unlike shareholders, lenders, or even the corporate debtor’s
employees, tort claimants often do not choose to engage in commercial
transactions with corporate debtors. Rather, their claims arise because the
debtor has harmed them without their consent. To protect their interests, tort
claimants often request that courts order the United States Trustee to appoint a
creditors’ committee to represent them. Courts have been authorized to do so
under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). While courts have the authority to form
creditors’ committees for tort claimants, courts do not uniformly grant tort
claimants’ requests.
Through the lens of the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway, Ltd.
bankruptcy case, this Comment argues that courts should form creditors’
committees for tort claimants when corporate debtors with tort liability file for
bankruptcy. Four arguments support this proposition. First, there are strong
policy reasons for forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants. Second,
courts need to form creditors’ committees for tort claimants to ensure that tort
claimants are guaranteed due process of the law. Third, forming creditors’
committees for tort claimants is consistent with the case law interpreting 11
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2), the Bankruptcy Code section authorizing the formation of
creditors’ committees. Finally, forming creditors’ committees for tort
claimants can have practical significance.
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INTRODUCTION
This Comment argues that courts should form a creditors’ committee of tort
claimants when a corporation with tort liability files for relief under chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).1 The Code currently authorizes courts to
form one or more creditors’ committees to represent unsecured creditors.2 The
Code gives these committees significant powers, including the ability to
negotiate a plan of reorganization with the debtor3 and the ability to hire
lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to represent the committee’s
interests.4
Although forming a creditors’ committee of tort victims is currently not
commonplace, such committees need to be the norm, not the exception, in
chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. The reasons why tort claimants need their own
creditors’ committee can be shown through the use of the following
hypothetical. Imagine losing a relative or suffering a serious injury at the hands
of a corporate tortfeasor. You desire compensation for your loss, but the
corporation that has harmed you has filed for bankruptcy. To make matters
worse, you find out that the corporation owes significant amounts of money to
several other parties. These parties include sophisticated individuals and
various companies that have voluntarily engaged in business with the corporate
debtor, including the corporation’s employees, lending institutions, and
suppliers. Some of these parties have secured claims so they will get paid in
full before you are paid, even if the debtor cannot pay you after it has satisfied
these debts. Others have positions on the unsecured creditors’ committee,
which will be able to hire professionals on the debtor’s dime. Such
professionals have the expertise and know-how to negotiate for better
repayment options and other advantageous treatment on behalf of their clients.
You have requested that the court appoint a creditors’ committee to represent
you. However, there is the chance that the court may instead give you only a
seat on the existing creditors’ committee, or may deny your request outright.
This possibility is a problem because the existing committee is stacked with
1 Chapter 11 is used primarily for business debtors to reorganize and continue operations or sell the
business as a going concern. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1101.01 (Alan Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an opportunity for a debtor to reorganize
its business or financial affairs or to engage in an orderly liquidation of its property either as a going concern
or otherwise.”).
2 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
3 Id. § 1103(c)(3).
4 Id. § 1103(a) (giving creditors’ committees the ability to employ “one or more attorneys, accountants,
or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee”).
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individuals whose interests and even possible avenues for repayment are
completely dissimilar from your own interests.
This hypothetical reflects the real-life plight of tort claimants in the
Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway, Ltd. (“MMA”) bankruptcy case. On
July 6, 2013, a train owned by MMA broke free from a rail yard in Nantes,
Quebec.5 At the time, the unmanned train was carrying about seventy-three
tank cars filled with crude oil.6 Soon after breaking free, the train derailed and
plowed into buildings in the nearby town of Lac-Megantic, Quebec.7 The
ensuing fires burned for thirty-six hours and wreaked havoc in the town center,
causing an estimated forty-seven deaths, countless other injuries, and leveling
forty buildings.8 Given the extent of the devastation experienced by accident
victims, news commentators have labeled the train crash the worst in North
America in twenty years.9
One month after the crash, MMA filed a voluntary petition for relief under
chapter 11 of the Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Maine.10 Later the same month, the estates of some of the people killed in
the train crash filed a motion to appoint a committee of creditors to represent
the interests of the wrongful death and personal injury claimants.11 A few days
later, the Quebec government, the town of Lac-Megantic, and the tort-victim’s
class-action representatives filed a similar motion with the bankruptcy court.12
The Chapter 11 Trustee13 opposed both of these motions.14 In his opinion,
5 Runaway Train Devastates Canadian Town, CNN (July 12, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
interactive/2013/07/world/canada-train-explosion/.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 David McLaughlin, Frederic Tomesco & Tiffany Kary, Montreal Maine Railway Files for Bankruptcy
After Crash, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0807/montreal-maine-railway-files-for-bankruptcy-after-crash.html (estimating $200 million in cleanup costs for
the accident); Runaway Train Devastates Canadian Town, supra note 5.
9 Louise Egan & Tom Hals, Railway in Deadly Quebec Explosion Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug.
7, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-train-montrealmaineatlantic-idUSBRE97614
E20130807.
10 Bankruptcy Petition, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Aug. 7, 2013),
ECF No. 1.
11 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, at 1, In re Montreal Me.
& Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Aug. 22, 2013), ECF No. 76.
12 Motion of Informal Committee of Quebec Claimants for Appointment of Creditors’ Committee
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 1102(a)(2) at 1, 5–6, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670
(Bankr. D. Me. Aug. 30, 2013), ECF No. 127 [hereinafter Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment].
13 In a railroad reorganization, a trustee is always appointed with input from the U.S. Department of
Transportation. 11 U.S.C. § 1163 (2012). In a typical chapter 11 case, however, a chapter 11 trustee is not
appointed, and the debtor serves as the debtor in possession, having the powers and duties of the chapter 11
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appointing a creditors’ committee in the case would be wholly unnecessary.15
However, the experience of tort claimants in other chapter 11 bankruptcy cases
strongly contradicts the Chapter 11 Trustee’s skepticism.
Tort claimants have faced harsh outcomes in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases
when they do not have their own creditors’ committee. In In re Chrysler, LLC,
more than 150 personal injury victims requested the bankruptcy court to
appoint an official creditors’ committee of tort claimants.16 Instead of
appointing a separate committee to represent the personal injury victims, the
United States Trustee17 appointed one tort claimant and one asbestos claimant
to an existing creditors’ committee.18 This creditors’ committee consisted
primarily of parties who were interested in selling Chrysler’s property “free
and clear” of tort liability.19 These creditors had negotiated a deal in which
they would receive an ownership interest in the newly formed Chrysler
entity.20 Eventually, these creditors prevailed over the tort claimants because
Chrysler’s assets were sold free and clear of the existing tort claims against
Chrysler.21 Chrysler provided virtually nothing to tort claimants who had
trustee. Id. § 1107(a). In chapter 11 cases, a trustee may be appointed to administer the bankruptcy estate and
operate the debtor’s business either for cause or if it is in the interest of creditors. Id. § 1104.
14 Trustee’s Consolidated Response to Motions for Appointment of Creditors’ Committee Filed by
Certain Wrongful Death Claimants & the Informal Committee of Quebec Claimants at 1, In re Montreal Me.
& Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Sept. 11, 2013), ECF No. 212.
15 Id.
16 Motion of Ad Hoc Committee of Consumer-Victims of Chrysler LLC for Appointment of Official
Committee of Tort Claimants Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) at 2–3, In re Chrysler LLC, No. 09-50002
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2009), ECF No. 273 [hereinafter Chrysler Motion for Appointment].
17 The United States Trustee serves as part of the U.S. Department of Justice and is charged with
overseeing the administration of bankruptcy cases and private trustees, including those appointed in chapter 11
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2012). In the context of chapter 11 cases, the United States Trustee is responsible
for appointing all members of creditors’ and equity security holders’ committees. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1); see
also In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 164 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
18 Motion of Ad Hoc Committee of Consumer Victims of General Motors for Appointment of Official
Committee of Tort Claimants Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) at 5, In re Gen. Motors, Inc., No. 09-50026
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009), ECF No. 287 [hereinafter Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment].
19 Id.
20 Under the terms of the deal, the U.S. Treasury would provide some of the funds to orchestrate the sale
of Chrysler to Fiat, and in return, the U.S. Treasury, Fiat, a Canadian entity, and the United Auto Workers
Union would receive ownership interests in the new Chrysler entity. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v.
Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom., Ind.
State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009).
21 See Order (I) Authorizing the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets Free & Clear of All
Liens, Claims, Interests and Encumbrances, (II) Authorizing the Assumption & Assignment of Certain
Executory Contracts & Unexpired Leases in Connection Therewith & Related Procedures, & (III) Granting
Related Relief, In re Chrysler, LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), ECF No. 3232 [hereinafter
Chrysler Order Authorizing Sale]; see also Master Transaction Agreement Among Fiat S.p.A., New Carco
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prepetition claims against it.22 Similarly, in In re General Motors, Inc., when
the court did not form a creditors’ committee to represent tort claimants,
General Motors’ assets were sold free and clear of more than 300 tort claims.23
In light of these problems, this Comment examines how and why creditors’
committees should be formed for tort claimants in chapter 11 bankruptcies.
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of creditors’
committees for the purpose of showing that these committees have certain
rights and powers which can be used to protect tort claimants’ interests. Part
II.A argues that forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants is supported
by public policy. Part II.B shows that such creditors’ committees are needed to
guarantee tort claimants due process of the law. Part II.C demonstrates that
forming committees of tort claimants is consistent with the case law addressing
the statutory requirements for creditors’ committees. Finally, Part II.D
contends that forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants is likely to have
important practical significance. Thus, this Comment will show that courts
should uniformly form creditors’ committees for tort claimants when a
corporation with tort liability files for bankruptcy.
I. INTRODUCTION TO CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES
This part of the Comment will describe why forming a creditors’
committee will protect tort claimants’ interests and how such committees can
be formed.

Acquisition LLC, Chrysler LLC and the Other Sellers Identified Herein (Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Master
Transaction Agreement], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotiveprograms/Documents/mta.pdf.
22 Under Chrysler’s plan of reorganization, the sole recovery for unsecured creditors was proceeds from
litigation instituted against Daimler. Disclosure Statement with Respect to Second Amended Joint Plan of
Liquidation of Debtors and Debtors in Possession, In re Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan.
22, 2010), ECF No. 6273; see also Order Confirming Second Amended Joint Plan of Liquidation of Debtors
and Debtors in Possession, as Modified, In re Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010),
ECF No. 6875. The case against Daimler was subsequently dismissed, Liquidation Trust v. Daimler AG (In re
Old Carco LLC), 435 B.R. 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), and the unsecured creditors of Chrysler received
nothing under the plan of reorganization. Notice of Conclusion of Daimler Litigation & Treatment of the
Daimler Fund Balance, In re Old Carco LLC, No. 09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2013), ECF No. 8198.
23 ‘New’ GM Agrees to Assume Future Liability Claims of ‘Old’ GM Products, CLAIMS JOURNAL (June
29, 2009), http://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2009/06/29/101794.htm (noting that the “New GM,”
the entity which purchased General Motors’ assets, will not assume liability for pending claims against the
automaker and those claimants will still be forced to seek compensation from the “Old GM”); see also Gen.
Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 2 (stating that just the ad hoc committee of tort claimants
consisted of more than 300 tort claimants).
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A. Advantages Afforded Debtors in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies
Chapter 11 provides debtors significant powers, which can be used at the
expense of a debtor’s creditors.24 Most importantly, the chapter 11 process
allows the debtor to modify its obligations to creditors while allowing the
debtor to continue operating its business or to sell its assets as a going
concern.25 In a traditional chapter 11 bankruptcy, a debtor specifies how it
plans to repay its debts by drafting a plan of reorganization.26 This plan is
supposed to be drafted based on input from a debtor’s creditors.27 A debtor
should take into account creditors’ input because a debtor’s reorganization plan
is similar to a contract between a debtor and its creditors—the debtor’s
obligations to pay its creditors are extinguished in exchange for what the
creditors receive under the plan.28
More recently, many corporate debtors have opted not to draft a
reorganization plan. Instead, they use the chapter 11 process to marshal their
assets in anticipation of selling all or a portion of the business as a going
concern in a § 363 sale.29 This process is known as a § 363 sale because § 363
of the Code gives a debtor the authority to sell assets outside the normal course
of business and without a reorganization plan.
Section 363 sales can impact tort claimants’ interests. The issue is that 11
U.S.C. § 363(f) gives debtors the ability to sell their property to a buyer free
and clear of “any interest in such property” under certain circumstances.30
While the Code does not define the phrase “any interest in such property,”
courts have interpreted this term broadly to include tort claims.31 When a
24 For example, in chapter 11 the debtor can modify the rights of creditors, obtain financing, recover
transferred property, and avoid obligations incurred prior to the commencement of the case. 7 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1100.01.
25 Id.
26 Id. ¶ 1100.09.
27 Id.
28 WILLIAM L. NORTON III & ROGER G. JONES, NORTON CREDITORS’ RIGHTS HANDBOOK § 18:1 (2014).
29 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 363.02[3]. While the chapter 11 plan process allows the
debtor to sell all or a portion of the business as a going concern, the debtor may prefer to use § 363 to sell all
or part of the business outside of the plan process if, for example, the delays inherent to the plan process could
result in squandering the value of the estate. Id. Section 363 can be used even if there is “no emergency
requiring immediate action.” Id.
30 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). See generally Alla Raykin, Comment, Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due
Process?, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 91 (2012) (discussing the use of § 363 sales to expedite the bankruptcy
process and some troubling implications for creditors’ due process rights).
31 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 297 B.R. 774, 780–81 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs’
personal injury claims are “interest(s) in such property” that debtor sold free and clear to defendant); Am.
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purchaser acquires the debtor’s property free and clear of tort claims or any
other interests, it gets a court order stating that it acquired the property free and
clear of these interests.32 Purchasers want to obtain such a court order because
they could use the court order in later disputes to show that they are not
responsible for paying any of the debtor’s debts even though they acquired the
debtor’s property.33
Thus, § 363 sales can have important implications for tort claimants for at
least two reasons. First, tort victims may not be able to recover anything from a
purchaser if the purchaser acquires the debtor’s assets free and clear of tort
claims. Second, if the debtor’s assets are sold free and clear of preexisting tort
liability, tort claimants may only receive adequate compensation if the sales
price is high enough to cover the debtor’s tort liability, since the purchaser may
not be responsible for satisfying the debtor’s tort liability. As such, as in
drafting a reorganization plan, tort claimants’ input is needed in § 363 sales
because such sales affect how much tort claimants will recover for their claims
against the debtor.
B. Role of Creditors’ Committees
Regardless of whether the debtor proceeds through the traditional plan
process or sells a substantial portion of its assets through a § 363 sale, the main
action for creditors is negotiating with the debtor. The creditors may have
varying interests such as seeing the debtor emerge from bankruptcy as a going
concern, maximizing the repayment of their debts, or gaining an equity stake in
the reorganized company. The Code provides a voice for creditors in this
process through the mandatory creation of at least one creditors’ committee.34

Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56 B.R. 186, 189–90 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986)
(holding 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) precludes tort claimants from asserting their claims against the purchaser who
bought the debtor’s assets free and clear of any interest in the debtor’s property).
32 See Felton E. Parrish et al., Sales of Assets Under Section 363, in 1-3 COLLIER GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11:
KEY TOPICS AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES ¶ 3.02 (Alan Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2014).
33 See id. The court order differentiates the § 363 sale from a sale under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which
requires the purchaser to defend against successor liability using arguments based in state law. Id.; see Morgan
Olson L.L.C. v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 467 B.R. 694, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Section
363(f) ‘can be used to sell property free and clear of claims that could otherwise be assertable against the buyer
of the assets under the common law doctrine of successor liability.’” (quoting George W. Kuney,
Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 235, 267 (2002)).
34 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2).
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Creditors’ committees represent the interests of the unsecured creditors
and, if necessary, the equity security holders.35 The creditors’ committee
generally consists of the holders of the seven largest unsecured claimholders,
although the committee may be larger in large corporate bankruptcies.36 The
committee members are appointed by the United States Trustee.37 The United
States Trustee must appoint at least one creditors’ committee and has the
authority to appoint additional committees.38 The court can also order that the
United States Trustee appoint additional committees, if requested by a “party
in interest.”39
The purpose of a creditors’ committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of
the larger body of creditors which it represents, either unsecured creditors or
equity security holders.40 In chapter 11 bankruptcies, a watchdog is needed
because, unlike in chapters 7 and 13, the debtor is permitted to act as its own
trustee when it files for bankruptcy.41 Because a disinterested trustee will not
be appointed in a typical chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the creditors’ committee
is specifically responsible for monitoring the debtor’s operations and activities,
and monitoring the debtor’s compliance with the requirements of the Code.42
As part of its monitoring responsibilities, creditors’ committees have
several duties and powers. These powers and duties are described in § 1103 of
the Code.43 Section 1103(a) gives creditors’ committees the ability to employ
“one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform
services for [the] committee.”44
35 Id. § 1102(a)(1); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1102.03 (discussing the requirements for
appointing a committee of equity security holders).
36 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1102.02[2]. The Enron
committee had thirteen members; and the Chrysler committee had eleven members. In re Enron, 279 B.R. 671
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); Appointment of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re Chrysler LLC, No.
09-50002 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009), ECF No. 366.
37 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
38 Id.
39 Id. § 1102(a)(2).
40 Advisory Comm. of Major Funding Corp. v. Sommers (In re Advisory Comm. of Major Funding
Corp.), 109 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Creditor Committees have the responsibility to protect the interest
of the creditors; in essence, ‘the function of a creditors’ committee is to act as a watchdog on behalf of the
larger body of creditors which it represents.’” (quoting AKF Foods, Inc., 36 B.R. 288, 289 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1984))).
41 Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108 (describing the powers and duties of the debtor in possession in
chapter 11), with id. §§ 701–702, 1302 (describing the powers of the trustee in chapters 7 and 13).
42 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 648 (2015).
43 11 U.S.C. § 1103; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.01.
44 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
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Section 1103(c) lists other powers that creditors’ committees possess.45
These powers are tools to protect their constituency’s financial interests. Of the
powers in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c), the committee’s ability to participate in the
formulation of a reorganization plan is probably the most important.46 Having
the ability to participate in the drafting of a reorganization plan is critical
because committee members may be able to consult and negotiate with the
debtor before the debtor submits its plan to the court.47 However, if specific
requirements are met, the Code does permit the court to confirm reorganization
plans even if some creditors do not approve of the plan.48 Similarly, the ability
to investigate the debtor’s business, another power imbedded in § 1103(c), is
important because a creditors’ committee may be able to better analyze how
the debtor should reorganize its business and repay creditors after reviewing
the debtors’ business records.49 Finally, because creditors’ committees may
“perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented,”
creditors’ committees can object to the allowance of other creditors’ claims.50
If these claims are not allowed, the return of all other creditors will be
increased because the debtor will have fewer claims to repay.51
While 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) states that a committee “may” use those powers,
the members of a committee have a duty to act in the best interests of their
constituents so they will be required to exercise such powers if doing so is
necessary to protect their constituents’ interests.52 Creditors’ committees are
supposed to use their significant powers to act in the best interests of the
creditors which they represent.53 For example, committee members cannot use
their powers to advance the interests of any individual member of the
committee over other members.54 Committee members are also required to
45

See id. § 1103(c).
Id.; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05.
47 But see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05[1][d] (“Nothing precludes the debtor
from filing a plan without committee support, but a debtor should always negotiate with the committees and
attempt to obtain their support.”).
48 This process is known as cramdown, and it allows a court to approve a reorganization plan as long as
all classes of creditors that vote against the plan receive at least as much as they would have in a chapter 7
liquidation and they are either paid in full or any junior claimholders will receive nothing under the plan. See
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (b).
49 See id. ¶ 1103.05[1][c].
50 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5); see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05.
51 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05[1][f].
52 Id. ¶ 1103.05.
53 Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 233, 256 (3d Cir. 2001); see 7 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1103.05.
54 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy, supra note 42, § 648.
46
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deal fairly with creditors of the class that they represent.55 However, in
practice, committee members may be incapable of fulfilling their fiduciary
duties because their interests may be opposed to other committee members’
interests.
Consider the interests of the various creditors in the MMA bankruptcy
case. By far, the largest number of creditors in the MMA bankruptcy case were
trade creditors.56 Trade creditors may have different interests than tort
claimants.57 Trade creditors may be willing to forgo full repayment of their
claims to help ensure that the debtor survives bankruptcy.58 Trade creditors
may want the debtor to be operating after the bankruptcy proceedings are
concluded so that the trade creditors can continue to sell goods and services to
the debtor.59 However, tort creditors will likely have no interest in continued
interactions with the debtor and they are more likely to have an immediate
need for funds than trade creditors since the debtor has already injured them by
causing damage to their physical health or personal property.60 Thus, trade
creditors and tort claimants may be unable to serve as fiduciaries for each
other. A potential solution to this problem is to appoint an additional creditors’
committee to represent only tort claimants.
C. Forming Creditors’ Committees
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) provides that creditors’ committees can be formed for
unsecured creditors and equity security holders.61 Tort claimants may be
appointed to such committees because tort claimants are unsecured creditors in
55

Id.
Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 10.
57 In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that persons with
contingent claims are eligible to serve on creditors’ committees), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (reversing the bankruptcy court to the extent it exceeded its authority by removing members of
the creditors’ committee).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Kenneth Ayotte & Yair Listokin, Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 7 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 403, 403–04 (2005). In the situation of mass tort liability that may manifest in the future, such as asbestos
exposure, potential claimants may be interested in having funds set aside to cover future claims. Id. These
types of tort claims may more closely resemble those of trade creditors, in that they have an interest in the
future availability of funds and the long-term wellbeing of the debtor.
61 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2012) (providing for the formation of a “committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims . . . or equity security holders”); In re Barneys, Inc., 197 B.R. 431, 440 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996) (“All creditors holding unsecured claims are eligible for committee membership.”); In re First
RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (stating to be eligible for membership on a
statutory committee, an entity must hold an unsecured prepetition claim).
56
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bankruptcy proceedings.62 A creditor is an individual or business that has “a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for
relief.”63 A claim covers all legal or equitable rights to payment even if they
are unliquidated, unmatured, contingent, or disputed.64 Therefore, even though
a tort claim may be disputed and unliquidated, it still meets the definition for a
claim under the Code. Furthermore, as unsecured claimants, tort creditors are
eligible to serve on the creditors’ committee. The difference between
unsecured and secured creditors is that secured creditors have an interest that is
backed not only by a debtor’s promise or obligation to pay but also by a second
contract in which the debtor has committed specific assets to the creditor as
collateral, which the creditor can seize if the debtor fails to honor its promise to
pay.65 A tort claimant satisfies all the conditions for serving on the creditors’
committee because she has a claim against the debtor for the injuries that it
inflicted upon her prior to bankruptcy and which is not secured by any
collateral.66 Thus, tort claimants may be appointed to a creditors’ committee.
Section 1102(a) of the Code gives the United States Trustee67 and the
courts the responsibility for forming creditors’ committees.68 11 U.S.C.
§ 1102(a)(1) requires the United States Trustee to appoint at least one
creditors’ committee.69 The Code states that “the United States trustee shall
appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims” as soon as
practical after the beginning of a chapter 11 case.70 In contrast, the Code gives
the United States Trustee the discretion to appoint additional creditors’
committees if he deems them appropriate.71 The Code states that the United
States Trustee “may appoint additional committees of creditors . . . as the

62 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 65 B.R. 160, 161 (E.D. Va. 1986); In re Farm Bureau Servs. Inc., 32 B.R.
69, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982).
63 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).
64 Id. § 101(5).
65 PAUL BARRON & MARK B. WESSMAN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 4 (2d ed.
2011).
66 But see Margaret I. Lyle, Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy
Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1297,
1305–06 (1983) (explaining that a tort victim could make himself a secured creditor if, before the debtor filed
for bankruptcy, the tort victim got a final judgment against the debtor and levied immediately upon the
debtor’s assets that were not subject to any prior security interests).
67 See supra note 17.
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)–(2).
69 Id. § 1102(a)(1), (3) (requiring the United States Trustee to form a creditors’ committee in a chapter 11
bankruptcy case except in a small business case in which there is cause not to form a creditors’ committee).
70 Id. § 1102(a)(1) (emphasis added).
71 Id.

MCCARTHY GALLEYSPROOFS

442

7/9/2015 1:00 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

United States trustee deems appropriate.”72 Thus, the United States Trustee is
not obligated to appoint multiple creditors’ committees even if creditors
request that a committee be formed.
Section 1102(b)(1) of the Code describes which unsecured creditors the
United States Trustee can appoint to the creditors’ committees.73 Section
1102(b)(1) states,
A committee of creditors . . . shall ordinarily consist of the persons,
willing to serve, that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor
of the kinds represented by the committee, or of the members of a
committee organized by creditors before the commencement of the
case under this chapter, if such committee was fairly chosen and is
representative of the different kinds of claims to be represented.74

Because of the Code’s use of the term “ordinarily,” courts have held that the
requirement that creditors on the committee hold the seven largest claims is
permissive rather than mandatory.75 The legislative history of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b)(1) also suggests that the language of this provision is not intended to
be binding on the United States Trustee.76 Specifically, the legislative history
of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) indicates that the language of this provision is
aspirational rather than mandatory, immutable, or binding.77 Thus, in some
cases, the United States Trustee has appointed creditors other than the seven
largest claimholders to creditors’ committees.78 Such considerations are
relevant in evaluating tort claimants’ ability to form creditors’ committees
because bankruptcy cases usually involve several unsecured creditors and
many of these creditors could have claims that greatly exceed the claims of tort
claimants.79

72

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 1102(b)(1).
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 See Kenneth N. Klee and K. John Shaffer, Creditors’ Committee Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995, 1005 & n.34 (1993).
76 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 401 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6357.
77 Id. (describing the statute’s text as “precatory”).
78 See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating creditors’
committee in the case consisted of nineteen members). See generally SALLY S. NEELY, Official Committees in
Chapter 11, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 33, 58 (2011).
79 See Carlos J. Cuevas, Due Process and Adequate Representation in a Chapter 11 Case: The
Appointment and Removal of Members of a Creditors’ Committee in a Reorganization, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV.
333, 334 (1989) (“The claims of unsecured creditors may range from ten dollars to millions of dollars.”).
73
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Section 1102(a)(2) grants bankruptcy courts the authority to review
whether the United States Trustee has appointed enough creditors’ committees
to represent the various creditors’ interests in the case.80 The touchstone in the
statute for evaluating whether to form an additional creditors’ committee is
whether creditors are adequately represented.81 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) states
that the court can “order the appointment of additional committees of
creditors . . . if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors.”82
The creditor making the request has the burden of proving inadequate
representation.83
Proving inadequate representation is a high standard. Courts view the
appointment of an additional creditors’ committee to be an extraordinary
remedy.84 In fact, the mere presence of conflict among committee members
does not show a lack of adequate representation unless the committee is also
unable to function or if its members have breached their fiduciary duties to
each other.85 Even if a party can show a lack of adequate representation, courts
have discretion to choose whether to appoint an additional creditors’
committee, and that finding will be binding unless clearly erroneous.86 Courts
interpret 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) as giving them discretion because the
language of § 1102(a)(2) is not mandatory.87 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) states that
courts “may order the appointment of additional committees of creditors”
rather than courts “must,” “shall,” or “are required to” order the appointment
of additional creditors’ committees.88

80 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) (stating the court may order the United States Trustee to appoint
additional creditors committees).
81 See id.
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
84 In re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The appointment of an additional
committee under section 1102(a)(2) is ‘extraordinary relief’”); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 778
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (stating courts have been reluctant to appoint an additional creditors’ committee
because it is an extraordinary remedy).
85 See, e.g., Dana Corp., 344 B.R. at 38–39; In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 861 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987).
86 Albero, 68 B.R. at 157.
87 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 142–43 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d on other
grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
88 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1127, 1585 (10th ed.
2014) (defining “may” as “to be a possibility” and “shall” as “has a duty to”).
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Nevertheless, courts have appointed multiple creditors’ committees when
such committees are needed in a particular case.89 Courts have appointed
additional creditors’ committees to represent employees, property holders,
priority creditors, subordinated note holders, retirees, and industry
competitors.90 This Comment will now move on to show why tort creditors
need their own creditors’ committee.
II. FORMING CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES FOR TORT CLAIMANTS
The remainder of this Comment will show that forming creditors’
committees is (1) needed for public policy reasons; (2) necessary to guarantee
tort claimants’ due process rights; (3) possible given the standards that courts
have adopted in evaluating whether to form a creditors’ committee; and (4)
practically important.
A. Policy Reasons
Public policy dictates why courts should order the creation of creditors’
committees for tort claimants in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. More so than any
other creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, tort claimants have been brought
into this forum involuntarily. Tort claimants do “not elect to work for, do
business with, or purchase the securities of,” a corporate debtor.91 In fact, tort
claimants do not choose to be injured at all.92
Tort claimants are also dissimilar from other creditors because tort
claimants do not have the ability to protect their interests in the same ways that
other creditors do.93 Prior to entering into a transaction with a corporation,
trade creditors can bargain with a corporation to protect themselves.94 These
89

E.g., Van Arsdale v. Clemo (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 65 B.R. 160 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van
Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987).
90 E.g., In re Patrick Cudahy, Inc., 88 B.R. 895 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (retirees); In re Texaco, Inc., 73 B.R.
960 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (industry competitors); Van Arsdale, 65 B.R. 160 (tort claimants); In re Mesta Mach.
Co., 67 B.R. 151, 156 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (employees); In re Nat’l Equip. & Mold Corp., 60 B.R. 133 (N.D. Ohio
1986) (priority creditors); In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 10 B.R 90 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (subordinated note
holders); In re Cloud Nine, Ltd., 3 B.R. 202 (D.N.M. 1980) (property holders); Peter C. Blain & Diane
Harrison O’Gawa, Creditors’ Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation,
Composition, Powers, and Duties, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 581, 592 & n.73–83 (1990).
91 See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1171.01 (describing tort claimants as “involuntary
creditors”).
92 See Lyle, supra note 66, at 1304.
93 See id. at 1305.
94 See id.
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creditors can demand a high interest rate or may ask for a security interest in
the debtor’s assets.95 However, tort claimants cannot anticipate that they will
have claims against the corporation so they cannot make such arrangements to
protect their interests.96 Moreover, after they are injured and before they have
received a judgment in their favor, tort claimants often have nothing to offer
the corporation in exchange for more favorable terms of repayment.97
The tort claimants in the MMA, General Motors, and Chrysler bankruptcy
cases illustrate these problems. In the MMA bankruptcy case, some of the tort
claimants included individuals “who happened to be in a small town café when
it, and they, were incinerated by the Debtor’s runaway train.”98 Other tort
claimants in the MMA bankruptcy case include property owners who
helplessly watched while their homes and businesses were engulfed by fires
nearly twelve stories high.99 Other tort claimants suffered severe property
damage when the train crashed into the town spilling 1.5 million gallons of
oil.100 Similarly, in the General Motors and Chrysler bankruptcy cases, the tort
claimants were individuals who involuntarily experienced devastating injuries
as a result of unknown defects in vehicles that Chrysler and General Motors
manufactured.101 Yet, all of these tort claimants were automatically lumped
into the class of unsecured creditors under the authority of the Code.102
To make matters worse, unlike commercial creditors, tort claimants may
not make up a sophisticated or economically stable group.103 In fact, tort
claimants may not be familiar with the Bankruptcy Code or with how to
protect themselves in a bankruptcy proceeding.104 For example, in the General
Motors and Chrysler bankruptcy cases, the tort claimants included individuals
95

See id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-203 (1978)).
See id.
97 See id.
98 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 3.
99 See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 12–13; McLaughlin, Tomesco
& Kary, supra note 8.
100 See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 1, 12–13; McLaughlin,
Tomesco & Kary, supra note 8.
101 See Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5; Chrysler Motion for Appointment,
supra note 16, at 5.
102 See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 1, 3; Gen. Motors Motion for
Appointment, supra note 18, at 4; Chrysler Motion for Appointment, supra note 16, at 4.
103 See, e.g., Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at
3 (stating tort claimants are unsophisticated); Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5
(stating tort claimants are economically fragile).
104 See, e.g., Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at
3 (stating tort claimants are not familiar with American bankruptcy law).
96
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who resided throughout the country and who struggled to find individual
representation to assert their claims.105 Similarly, in the MMA bankruptcy
case, the tort claimants include injured victims or family members representing
the estates of individuals killed in the crash.106 Moreover, these individuals
reside in Canada, are not familiar with American bankruptcy law, and may not
even speak English.107 Nevertheless, tort claimants like the MMA accident
victims will be treated like other unsecured creditors in bankruptcy
proceedings.
Some commentators have suggested that the Code’s drafters did not
anticipate that tort claims would frequently appear in the bankruptcy forum or
that debtors’ would use bankruptcy as a means to dealing with mass tort
liability.108 The thrust of this argument is that the Code was designed primarily
to operate in the context of commercial contractual relationships.109 According
to this argument, we can see evidence of this limited design in the fact that the
Code refers to the parties in a bankruptcy proceeding exclusively as creditors
and debtors and can be used to advance business interests over equitable
goals.110 However, since 1982 with the bankruptcies of several asbestos
manufacturers, companies facing mass tort liability have increasingly filed for
bankruptcy.111
To overcome the shortsightedness of the Code and to more generally
protect tort claimants, creditors’ committees of tort claimants need to be
formed.
B. Due Process Considerations
Due process considerations also suggest that creditors’ committees of tort
claimants are needed in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of corporate debtors. Due
process provides that the government cannot deprive an individual of life,

105 See Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 2, 5; Chrysler Motion for Appointment,
supra note 16, at 5.
106 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Withdrawal of their Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committees at 1,
4–5, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Sept. 27, 2013), ECF No. 291.
107 Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 3.
108 See Lyle, supra note 66, at 1304.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS TORT BANKRUPTCY
CASES 1 (2005), available at http://www2.fjc.gov/content/judicial-management-mass-tort-bankruptcy-cases-0.
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liberty, or property without notice and the opportunity to be heard.112 By
comparing class action suits and chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, this Comment
will show that tort claimants may be deprived of due process when courts fail
to order the United States Trustee to form creditors’ committees for tort
claimants.
1. Comparison of Class Action Suits and Chapter 11 Bankruptcies
Chapter 11 bankruptcies are similar to class action suits in a variety of
ways.113 A chapter 11 bankruptcy involves a group of unsecured creditors
whom the debtor has harmed by failing to repay its debts or, as in the case of
tort claimants, by physically injuring them.114 Similarly, a class action suit
involves several injured parties.115 In a class action suit, the court authorizes a
representative to litigate on behalf of a class of absent persons; whereas, in a
chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the court or the United States Trustee form a
creditors’ committee to represent the interests of the debtor’s unsecured
creditors.116 Like the actions of a creditors’ committee, the actions of a class
representative can significantly impact the members that she represents—
potentially affecting their ability to recover against the defendant.117
2. Adequate Representation Standard in Class Action Suits
Since class members will be bound by the outcome of a class action law
suit, due process requires that the class representative adequately represent
their interests. Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embodies
this requirement, listing the requirements that must be met before a court may
certify a class action suit.118 Like the bankruptcy standard for forming a
112 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see W. Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43
F.3d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in Bankruptcy:
Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J.
329, 335 (1996).
113 See Cuevas, supra note 79, at 336.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1), (3) (2012) (describing the responsibilities of committee members in
bankruptcy), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (describing the requirements of class representatives in class actions).
117 See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1765 (3d ed. 2014) (“If the absent members are to be conclusively bound by the result of an action
prosecuted or defended by a party alleged to represent their interests, basic notions of fairness and justice
demand that the representation they receive be adequate.”).
118 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (providing additional requirements that must be
met before a court can certify a class action suit).
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creditors’ committee, Rule 23(a) establishes that any class representative needs
to “fairly and adequately” represent the needs of the class.119 Rule 23(a)
requires adequate representation to ensure that class members receive due
process in class action suits.120 Due process is a concern in class action suits
because judgments in class action suits can bind the members of the class
regardless of whether the judgments are favorable or whether the class
members are present during the proceedings.121
The requirement of adequate representation imposes two limitations.122
Adequate representation necessitates: (1) that the interests of the class
representative not impermissibly conflict with those of the class he or she
seeks to represent and (2) that the class counsel be competent.123 In applying
the requirement of adequate representation, courts focus on whether the
proposed class representative’s interests are antagonistic to the interests of the
class that he or she seeks to represent.124
Courts have consistently found a lack of adequate representation when the
economic interests of the proposed class representative conflict with the
members of the class that she seeks to represent.125 Bieneman v. City of
Chicago is illustrative of how class members’ conflicting interests can destroy
class certification.126 In that case, a homeowner sought to bring a class action
suit on behalf of all landowners in the vicinity of an airport.127 The homeowner
claimed that the airport owner had harmed the class members by expanding the
airport facilities in an area close to their properties.128 Although the airport
expansion might cause the value of residential homes to decrease, the court
pointed out that other property owners would “undoubtedly derive great
benefit” from the expansion.129 Specifically, the court proposed that business

119

Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”), with 11
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2012) (“assure adequate representation of creditors”).
120 See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, at § 1768.
121 See id. at § 1765.
122 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
123 Id.
124 See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 117, at § 1768.
125 See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Rule
23(a)(4) . . . preclude[s] class certification where the economic interests and objectives of the named
representatives differ significantly from the economic interests and objectives of unnamed class members.”).
126 864 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 465.
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owners would enjoy more business from increased airport operations.130
Because of their different economic interests, the court declined to certify the
class.131 This case demonstrates that a court cannot certify a class action suit if
the representative’s interests conflict with those of some of the proposed class
members.
3. Applying the Rules from Class Action Suits
The rules for class action suits provide strong support for the appointment
of committees of tort claimants because tort claimants’ financial interest often
conflict with other creditors’ financial interests.132 In bankruptcy cases, tort
claimants generally have the same priority as other unsecured creditors,
meaning that the debtor is not required to satisfy tort claims before it pays
other unsecured creditors.133 Tort creditors and other unsecured creditors
would typically be paid the same pro rata share of their claims in a chapter 7
liquidation, and therefore they would be eligible for the same baseline
repayment in a chapter 11 reorganization.134 Although their claims are of equal
priority, tort claimants’ interests may be at odds with other creditors’ interests
because tort claimants may prefer immediate relief. Faced with high medical
bills or other expenses, tort claimants and their families may prefer liquidation
of the debtor’s assets rather than reorganization of the debtor so that they can
obtain prompt payment of their claims. This preference may conflict with trade
creditors’ interests because a debtor’s trade creditors are often interested in
“having a reorganized company around to sell goods and services to at a later
date.”135
Even if trade creditors also want the debtor to sell its assets, trade creditors’
interests may not be well-aligned with tort claimants’ interests. A purchaser
may be incentivized to satisfy the debts that a debtor owes to trade creditors
because a purchaser may need to do business with those trade creditors once it
130

Id.
Id.
132 See Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 6.
133 The one counter-example is the priority treatment of personal injury and wrongful death claims against
railroads. 11 U.S.C. § 1171 (2012) (granting that these claims will be paid as an administrative expense of the
estate).
134 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2), (b) (requiring a chapter 7 debtor to repay unsecured creditors on the
same pro rata basis), with id. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (requiring chapter 11 debtors repay holders of unsecured claims
at least what they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation if the class votes against the plan of
reorganization).
135 In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing In re Altair Airlines,
727 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1984)), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
131
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has assumed the debtor’s property. However, a purchaser will not need to work
with tort claimants so it will not have a similar incentive to assume a debtor’s
tort liability.
Moreover, unlike most creditors, tort victims’ claims may in part be
covered by insurance.136 However, the availability of such insurance funds is
often not sufficient to fully compensate tort claimants for their injuries.
Consider the MMA bankruptcy case. MMA had an insurance policy of $25
million, which covered costs related to bodily injury, property damage, and
pollution.137 Yet, the costs to clean up the oil spilled are estimated to be $193
million alone.138 Although insurance proceeds are often insufficient to cover
tort victims’ claims, the availability of such funds could be used to justify
paying tort victims less on a pro rata basis than other unsecured creditors. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b) provides that a court can confirm the terms of a debtor’s
reorganization plan as long as the plan does not unfairly discriminate against
some creditors. Arguably, a court may think that a plan providing for a smaller
payout to tort claimants does not unfairly discriminate against them because
they have access to funds outside of the plan.
Tort claimants may also be entitled to additional post-confirmation relief.139
28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) provides that the Code “do[es] not affect any right to trial
by jury that an individual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard
to a personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.”140 Because tort claimants
have the ability to sue debtors after bankruptcy proceedings are concluded, tort
claimants may be interested in setting up a trust or other device that will be
used to pay any judgments that they receive in post-confirmation litigation.
Other creditors will not be interested in providing for these mechanisms unless
they also have the ability to sue the debtor post-confirmation. Setting up a trust
136

See Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55–56 (5th Cir. 1993). Many states allow a
tort creditor of a bankrupt estate to substitute itself as the beneficiary of a plan of insurance held by the debtor
to cover their claims under direct action statutes. Giroux v. Purington Bldg. Sys., Inc., 670 A.2d 1227, 1229
(R.I. 1996) (discussing a Rhode Island statute that allowed a wrongful death plaintiff to substitute for the
insured on the insurance policy when the insured had filed for bankruptcy, and allowing the plaintiff to recover
from the insurer to the policy limits). However, insurance policies are typically property of the estate, and if
insurance proceeds become part of the estate, they are eligible for pro rata distribution to all unsecured
creditors. In re Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 580 F. App’x 82, 84–87 (2014).
137 Richard Summerfield, Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway Files for Bankruptcy Protection,
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, Oct. 2013, available at http://www.financierworldwide.com/montreal-maine-andatlantic-railway-files-for-bankruptcy-protection/#.VSWt9_nF_IY.
138 Id.
139 See 28 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2012).
140 See id.
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will also be against their interests because doing so will decrease the amount of
money that can be paid to all other creditors. Thus, tort claimants need a means
to voice their individual interests.
If a court does not appoint a committee for tort claimants, tort claimants do
not have meaningful ways to participate in the proceedings. Consider tort
claimants’ ability to vote on a debtor’s reorganization plan. Like all other
creditors, tort claimants have the right to vote on a debtor’s reorganization
plan.141 If the creditors reject the plan, the court may not be able to confirm the
debtor’s reorganization plan.142 Creditors vote on the plan in classes or
groups.143 However, as part of the plan process, the debtor is responsible for
arranging creditors into these classes. The debtor could use this power to put
tort claimants in a class dominated by other creditors who favor the plan.144 If
tort claimants are outnumbered, they might not be able to effectively oppose a
plan that goes against their best interests. Furthermore, it is possible that such a
plan could be confirmed because a plan can be confirmed over the opposition
of some creditors if the plan meets other requirements.145
The Code protects creditors’ rights by giving them the right to appear and
raise any concern in a bankruptcy case.146 Because tort claimants are often
economically fragile and unfamiliar with the Code, tort claimants may not be
able to take advantage of this opportunity.147 Additionally, the Code provides
that the debtor must provide notice to those parties “who are likely to have the
most interest in a particular type of proceeding in the typical case, and who are
most likely to care about participation.”148 However, merely providing notice
to tort claimants does not guarantee due process because the right to notice has
little value if tort claimants do not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Thus, the existing avenues for participating in a bankruptcy case do not
provide a robust form of due process for tort claimants. However, because
141

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–502, 1126(a) (2012).
See id. § 1129(a)(7)–(8).
143 See id. §§ 1123(a)(1)–(4), 1126.
144 See id. § 1123(a)(1)–(4).
145 See id. § 1129(b) (describing the requirements of cramdown, which permits confirmation of a
reorganization plan despite creditor opposition).
146 Id. § 1109(b).
147 See, e.g., Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at
3 (stating tort claimants are not familiar with American bankruptcy law); Gen. Motors Motion for
Appointment, supra note 18, at 5 (stating tort claimants are economically fragile).
148 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 1109.06 (“[T]he rules balance the importance of
notice against the costs of notice, recognizing that notice of every proceeding to every party in interest in every
case would often be a waste of time and resources.”).
142
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“bankruptcy relief is powerful medicine, often resulting in the profound
alteration . . . of a host of otherwise valid legal obligations,”149 the Code should
provide tort claimants a robust form of due process.
Thus, courts should form creditors’ committees to ensure that tort claimants
enjoy due process.
C. Consistent with Case Law Interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2)
In addition to the public policy and due process reasons for appointing an
additional creditors’ committee to represent tort claimants, case law
interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) also supports this proposal. Although
§ 1102(a)(2) does not provide a framework for evaluating whether an
additional creditors’ committee is warranted, courts have identified certain
factors to consider in evaluating whether creditors are adequately represented
by existing committees.150 Courts most commonly cite the following factors:
(1) the nature of the case; (2) the ability of the committee to function; (3) the
potential for added cost and the timeliness of the motion; and (4) the desires of
the constituencies.151 These factors weigh strongly in favor of forming a
creditors’ committee of tort claimants when a corporate debtor files for relief
under chapter 11 of the Code.
1. Nature of the Case
In enacting 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2), Congress recognized that in bankruptcy
cases involving several types of creditors or equity holders a single creditors’
committee could not adequately represent the interests of all the creditors in
the case.152 Congress stated that courts are authorized to use § 1102(a)(2) to
create additional creditors’ committees when “the debtor proposes to affect
several classes of debt or equity holders.”153 Therefore, some courts have
found the size of the proceeding, whether it includes several classes of debt or

149

Id. ¶ 1109.02[3b].
See In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d on other grounds,
212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Hill Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 5–6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re McLean
Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re JohnsManville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
151 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 141; Hill Stores Co., 137 B.R. at 5–6; McLean Indus., Inc., 70
B.R. at 860-61; Albero, 68 B.R. at 159.
152 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 142; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 401 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6357.
153 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 401, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6357.
150
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equity holders, to be particularly significant in determining whether additional
creditors’ committees are warranted.154
For example, in In re Beker Industries Corp., the court ordered the United
States Trustee to appoint an additional creditors’ committee of stock and
debenture holders in part because the case was large and complex.155 The case
involved several creditor groups, including numerous public utility entities and
debenture holders, as well as equity holders, namely common and preferred
stockholders.156 The court explained that additional creditors’ committees are
warranted in a large bankruptcy case, in which there are several groups of debt
and equity holders, because “committees should be composed of creditors . . .
representative of classes as a whole as opposed to dissident factions of
particular classes.”157
Additionally, the court explained that multiple creditors’ committees are
warranted in large bankruptcy proceedings because creditors have to take an
active role in such cases to protect their interests.158 The court stated that
creditors will have to take an active role in large bankruptcy proceedings to
protect their interests because “[a] large case brings with it . . . a complex
business requiring significant post-petition financing and a heavily negotiated
plan.”159
In the bankruptcies of corporate debtors, the case will often be large and
complex affecting several types of creditors. For example, the MMA
bankruptcy case is exceedingly large and complex because it has affected
hundreds of different unsecured creditors.160 These unsecured creditors include
railroad equipment vendors, a public utility company, insurance companies,
and financial institutions in addition to the tort claimants.161 Given the law on

154

See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 144 (“The Court finds that the case is large and complex and is
the type that can justify additional committees.”); In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc., 96 B.R. 779, 781
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (“[T]he size and complexity of debtor’s bankruptcy’s proceedings weigh in favor of
the appointment of an additional committee.”); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 55 B.R. 945, 948–49 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The complex nature of this large case requires representation . . . .”). But see In re Dana
Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating size of the bankruptcy case is not determinative of
whether additional creditors’ committees are warranted).
155 See 55 B.R. at 949.
156 Id. at 947.
157 Id. at 948–49 (quoting 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1102.2 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1984)).
158 See id. at 949.
159 Id.
160 See Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 10.
161 See id.
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point, which suggests that additional creditors’ committees are needed when a
case affects several types of debt or equity holders, courts should order the
United States Trustee to appoint additional committees for tort claimants in the
bankruptcies of corporate debtors such as MMA.
2. Ability of the Committee to Function
In addition to the nature of the bankruptcy case, courts commonly consider
the ability of the committee to function to determine if an additional committee
is appropriate.162 In evaluating a committee’s ability to function, courts
examine whether the existing committee is able to reach a consensus on the
issues that require the committee’s approval and whether creditors have a
meaningful voice on the committee.163 If an existing committee is “hopelessly
divided, unable to take a position on important matters and ineffective,” then a
court is more likely to hold that an additional committee is needed.164
However, as the court in In re Dow Corning Corp. explained, the analysis
should not end there.165
In evaluating whether creditors are adequately represented on the creditors’
committee, courts should assess whether a creditor group has a meaningful
voice on the committee.166 In In re Dow Corning Corp., the court looked
beyond the committee’s ability to function in evaluating whether an additional
creditors’ committee is warranted.167 The court explained that creditors may
not be adequately represented even if the existing committee is able to function
and to reach a consensus on all the important issues before it.168 The problem is
that a creditors’ committee may be “so dominated by one group of creditors
that a separate group has virtually no say in the decision-making process.”169
Instead, the court stated that courts need to evaluate whether the creditors in

162 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 671, 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Hills Stores Co., 137
B.R. 4, 5–6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 100 B.R. 767, 779 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (finding
that the conflict among committee members did not prevent adequate representation).
163 See Enron Corp., 279 B.R. at 686; In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1996), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
164 Enron Corp., 279 B.R. at 686.
165 See 194 B.R. at 142.
166 See id. at 141–42; see also Enron Corp., 279 B.R. at 693 (denying to form an additional creditors’
committee when the creditors’ concerns had been heard through the existing creditors’ committee).
167 See 194 B.R. at 142.
168 See id.
169 See id.
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the case have “a meaningful voice” on the existing committee or whether
particular creditors are “effectively disenfranchised.”170
When courts fail to form creditors’ committees exclusively for tort
claimants, tort claimants can become effectively disenfranchised. Two
bankruptcies in particular, In re Chrysler and In re General Motors, illustrate
this problem. In In re Chrysler, tort claimants were appointed to an official
creditors’ committee.171 However, other unsecured creditors made up most of
the creditors’ committee.172 These other unsecured creditors were interested in
selling Chrysler’s assets free and clear of tort claims to Chrysler’s successor
because their own claims would be satisfied through the sale transaction.173
Because these other unsecured creditors dominated the creditors’ committee
and supported the sale, tort claimants were unable to oppose the sale and
received nothing because the sales price was insufficient to repay all of the
creditors.174
Similarly, in In re General Motors, the court did not form a creditors’
committee to represent tort claimants and the debtor sold its assets free and
clear of tort claims.175 Like in In re Chrysler, the other unsecured creditors
supported a sale free and clear of General Motors’ tort claims176—their own
interests being satisfied through the sale.177 General Motors’ successor offered
unsecured bondholders an ownership in the new General Motors company.178
For other unsecured creditors, General Motors’ successor offered to assume the
contracts that the creditors had made with the old General Motors for supplies
and dealerships.179 However, if the court had appointed a separate committee
of tort claimants, tort claimants’ voices would not have been drowned out by
170

See id. at 141–42.
Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5.
172 Id.
173 See Chrysler Order Authorizing Sale, supra note 21; see also Master Transaction Agreement, supra
note 21.
174 See supra note 22.
175 See ‘New’ GM Agrees to Assume Future Liability Claims of ‘Old’ GM Products, supra note 23.
176 In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 473–74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
177 Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 4.
178 See Kendra Marr, GM Bondholders Vote on Sweetened Deal, WASH. POST, May 31, 2009, at A14
(describing the deal between the U.S. Treasury and GM’s bondholders to grant them an ownership stake in
“New GM” in return for their support of GM’s § 363 sale); David Welch, Old GM Bondholders Getting
Shares in New GM May Depress Price, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 7, 2011 12:01AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-06/old-gm-bondholders-getting-shares-in-new-general-motors-maydepress-price (discussing the release of New GM stock to former bondholders of Old GM).
179 Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 483 (“Substantially all of old GM’s executory contracts with direct
suppliers are likely to be assumed and assigned to New GM.”).
171
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other creditors on the committee with dissimilar interests. With their own
voice, tort claimants may be more successful in negotiating with the debtor and
purchaser for a higher sales price or for a sale in which the purchaser assumes
the debtor’s tort liability.
3. Timing and Added Cost
In deciding whether to order the United States Trustee to appoint additional
creditors’ committees, courts also consider the added cost associated with
forming the committees and the timing of a party’s motion.180 These factors are
balanced against whether the creditors’ committee adequately represents the
creditors in the proceeding.181 These discretionary factors should not prevent
the appointment of a separate committee if it is otherwise justified by a
concern for adequate representation.182
a. Timing of 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) Motion
Parties need to promptly file a motion under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) to
form a creditors’ committee.183 In In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire,
the court denied the creditor group’s motion to form an additional creditors’
committee because the motion was not timely filed.184 The creditor group filed
their motion for formation of an additional creditors’ committee four months
after the United States Trustee had appointed a single creditors’ committee.185
180 See generally Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 671 (“Discretionary considerations include: 1. The cost
associated with the appointment; 2. The time of the application; 3. The potential for added complexity; and 4.
The presence of other avenues for creditor participation.”).
181 See generally id. (“[T]he court must determine whether the appointment of an additional committee is
necessary to assure the movants are adequately represented. . . . [I]f the answer to the first question is yes, then
the court must decide whether it should exercise its discretion and order the appointment.”).
182 See, e.g., In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing In re McLean Indus.,
Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)) (stating the potential added cost is not sufficient in itself to
deprive the creditors of the formation of an additional committee if one is otherwise appropriate); In re
Texaco, Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[A] price tag should not be placed on adequate
representation.”) (holding that a separate committee for unsecured oil and gas creditors was no longer required
to adequately represent their interests).
183 See Ad Hoc Bondholders Grp. v. Interco Inc. (In re Interco Inc.), 141 B.R. 422, 424–25 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1992); Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. at 7–8; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 211
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 89 B.R. 1014, 1020 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988); Albero v.
Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Van Arsdale v. Clemo
(In re A.H. Robins Co.), 65 B.R. 160, 162 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d
794 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a party’s motion was not promptly filed when it filed a motion to dissolve
the committee of tort claimants seven weeks after the United States Trustee selected the committee).
184 89 B.R. at 1020.
185 Id. at 1016–17.
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The court found it significant that the case was far along in the proceeding and
that the formation of an additional creditors’ committee would delay and
disrupt the conclusion of the proceeding.186
Similarly, in In re Johns-Manville, the court affirmed the lower court’s
denial of a motion to form an additional creditors’ committee.187 The court
explained that the creditors had waited too long because the debtor was in its
final stages of reorganization.188 At this point, the court believed that it would
be “too late for a committee to exercise its most important function—
negotiating a reorganization plan—as a reorganization plan ha[d] already been
submitted to the bankruptcy court.”189
While these examples demonstrate the consequences of submitting an
untimely motion for an additional creditors’ committee, tort claimants have
typically filed timely motions.190 Therefore, timing concerns generally should
not come into play in a court’s deliberation about whether to order the United
States Trustee to appoint a creditors’ committee for tort claimants.
b. Added Cost
Opponents of forming additional creditors’ committees often focus on the
fact that additional creditors’ committees entail additional expenses for the
bankruptcy estate.191 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) authorizes creditors’ committees to
hire professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, at the expense of the
bankruptcy estate.192 Moreover, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(F), the

186

Id. at 1020.
68 B.R. at 165.
188 Id. at 163.
189 Id.
190 For example, in In re General Motors and In re Chrysler, tort claimants filed their motions to form
additional creditors’ committees within a few days of the debtors’ bankruptcy filings. Chrysler LLC filed a
voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Code on April 30, 2009. The tort claimants in this case
filed a motion requesting the court to form an additional creditors’ committee on May 4, 2009. Chrysler
Motion for Appointment, supra note 16, at 1, 7. Likewise, General Motors filed a voluntary petition for relief
under chapter 11 on June 1, 2009. On June 2, 2009, its tort claimants filed a motion requesting the court to
form an additional creditors’ committee of tort claimants. Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note
18, at 1, 6.
191 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d on other grounds,
212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 55 B.R. 945, 949 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012). The provision states,
187

At a scheduled meeting of a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, at which a
majority of the members of such committee are present, and with the court’s approval, such
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bankruptcy estate may be required to compensate members of creditors’
committees for out-of-pocket expenses.193 These expenses and fees are in part
what cause the bankruptcy estate to incur additional costs when the court or the
United States Trustee appoint an additional creditors’ committee.194
While courts should review added costs, courts can minimize these costs so
as to provide for additional creditors’ committees.195 Courts can minimize
professional expenses because a committee’s employment of professionals is
ultimately subject to court approval.196 The Bankruptcy Rules, which govern
procedures for bankruptcy proceedings, provide the application that creditors’
committees should use in requesting the court’s approval to hire
professionals.197 This application requires creditors to state the specific need
for hiring a professional, the professional’s name, the reasons for selecting the
particular professional, the professional services to be rendered, any proposed
arrangements for compensation, and any connections that the professional
might have with the debtor.198 Even if a court allows a creditors’ committee to
hire professionals, a court does not have to compensate these professionals if
the professionals’ fees are unreasonable or duplicative.199
Courts have exercised their power to restrict the hiring of lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals by creditors’ committees.200 In In re
Cumberland Farms, Inc., the court held that a separately appointed creditors’

committee may select and authorize the employment by such committee of one or more
attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee.
Id.

193 See id. § 503(b) (“After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative expenses . . . (3)
[for] the actual, necessary expenses . . . incurred by . . . (F) a member of a committee appointed under section
1102 of this title, if such expenses are incurred in the performance of the duties of such committee . . . .”).
194 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 143; Beker Indus. Corp., 55 B.R. at 949.
195 See Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 143; In re Cumberland Farms, Inc. 142 B.R. 593, 594–96 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1992) (denying the committee’s request to hire counsel at the expense of the estate); In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. 118 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating in dicta that the court could
control the costs of creating separate committees by ordering the committees to share accountants); Blain &
O’Gawa, supra note 98, at 596.
196 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (“[W]ith the court’s approval, . . . committee[s] may select and authorize the
employment by such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform
services for such committee[s].”); Blain & O’Gawa, supra note 90, at 596.
197 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014(a).
198 Id.
199 See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (stating the court may award “reasonable” compensation and that
the court may award less than the amount of compensation requested by the professional).
200 See Cumberland Farms, Inc., 142 B.R. at 595–96; Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 118 B.R. at
211.
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committee of lenders was not allowed to employ legal counsel at the
bankruptcy estate’s expense because that legal counsel’s efforts would merely
duplicate services provided by the unsecured creditors’ committee.201
Similarly, in In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., the court noted that
in previous cases, courts have “required separate committees to share
accountants” out of concern for costs.202 In addition to limiting the hiring of
professionals, the court in In re Beker Industries suggested that courts can
require the various creditors’ committees to “determine their joint interests and
address them jointly[, take] steps to minimize duplication,” and monitor costly
fees and other expenses.203
Given these considerations, concerns about additional costs should not
prevent a court from ordering the United States Trustee to appoint a creditors’
committee for tort claimants.
4. Desires of the Constituencies
In chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of corporate debtors, tort claimants have
widely supported the formation of additional creditors’ committees to represent
them. For example, in the MMA bankruptcy case, the train crash killed fortyseven people.204 Of the decedents, thirty-three of their estates supported the
motion requesting the court to form an additional creditors’ committee.205
Moreover, the Canadian government representatives and the pending classaction claimants also wanted the court to form a creditors’ committee to
represent tort claimants.206
Thus, the case law supports forming creditors’ committees of tort claimants
in bankruptcies of corporate debtors.
D. Practical Significance
This Comment does not claim that forming creditors’ committees for tort
claimants will guarantee tort claimants will always be successful in achieving
all of their objectives. However, as the MMA bankruptcy case illustrates, tort
claimants may be better off if such committees are formed.
201
202
203
204
205
206

142 B.R. at 595–96.
118 B.R. at 211.
55 B.R. 945, 951 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Wrongful Death Claimants’ Motion for Formation of Creditors’ Committee, supra note 11, at 5.
Id.
See Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Motion for Appointment, supra note 12, at 1.
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In the MMA bankruptcy case, the court reached the right result. On
October 18, 2013, the court ordered the United States Trustee to appoint a
creditors’ committee for victims of the accident.207 In doing so, the court
explained that a creditors’ committee of victims was needed “[to] give official
standing and [a] voice to victims who may be without one in these
proceedings” and to “give the trustee and other parties a point of contact and
[a] negotiating partner on a plan and any other issue in the case.”208
Once formed, the committee of tort claimants embraced the powers that the
Code affords creditors’ committees.209 On January 8, 2014, the committee filed
a motion requesting the court’s approval to let the committee hire legal counsel
to represent the committee’s interests in the case.210 After the court granted the
committee’s request,211 the committee’s hired counsel filed a motion
requesting that the court require the debtor and other parties to sit down and
discuss specific issues surrounding the case.212
Despite the successes, there have been some setbacks in the case from the
tort claimants’ perspective. The court issued an order approving the sale of
MMA’s assets free and clear of liens, claims, and interests to Railroad
Acquisitions Holdings, LLC.213 The order states that the term “liens, claims,
and interests,” includes any claims arising from tort claims and specifies that
the purchaser will only be responsible for certain “Assumed Liabilities.”214
Tort claims were not part of the Assumed Liabilities so Railroad Acquisitions
Holdings, LLC will not assume responsibility for paying the tort claimants.215
207 Order Authorizing the Appointment of a Victims’ Committee at 4, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry.,
Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Oct. 18, 2013) ECF No. 391.
208 Id. at 3.
209 See, e.g., Application for Order, Pursuant to Sections 328, 330, & 1103 of Bankruptcy Code,
Authorizing Employment and Retention of Paul Hastings LLP as Counsel to Official Committee of Victims, In
re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Jan. 8, 2014), ECF No. 559.
210 Id. at 1.
211 Order Authorizing Employment and Retention of Paul Hastings LLP as Counsel to Official Committee
of Victims Pursuant to Sections 328, 330, & 1103 of Bankruptcy Code, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd.,
No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Feb. 11, 2014), ECF No. 647.
212 Motion of Official Committee of Victims Pursuant to Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol Requesting
Joint Status Conference Before U.S. & Canadian Court at 1, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry., Ltd., No. 1310670 (Bankr. D. Me. Feb. 7, 2014), ECF No. 620.
213 Order (I) Approving (A) Sale of Assets Pursuant to Asset Purchase Agreement with Railroad
Acquisition Holdings LLC, (B) Sale of Assets Free & Clear of Liens, Claims, & Interests, & (C) Assumption
& Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts & Unexpired Leases Thereto & (II) Granting Related Relief, In
re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Jan, 24, 2014), ECF No. 594.
214 Id. at 15.
215 Id. at 9, 12.
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The other problem is that the total purchase price is far less than the estimated
value of the tort claims so tort claimants will receive only a portion of the
value of their claims.216
Although tort claimants suffered this setback, as of the writing of this
Comment, several news outlets reported that a settlement fund had been
drafted to repay tort claimants. According to these news outlets, MMA, its
insurers, its founder, Edward Burkhardt, and several other entities linked to the
derailment will contribute to a settlement fund that will then be used to repay
tort claimants.217 The exact amount of this settlement fund has yet to be
determined, but the Chapter 11 Trustee has indicated that he hopes to obtain as
much as $500 million for the tort claimants.218 Importantly, there is reason to
believe that the committee of tort claimants helped to achieve this settlement.
Prior to the settlement, the committee of tort claimants had said that it “worked
tirelessly with the Trustee in hopes of achieving a global settlement that would
result in adequate compensation for the victims.”219 Thus, it is likely that the
efforts of the committee of tort claimants in the MMA bankruptcy case
contributed to better repayment terms for tort victims.
CONCLUSION
Tort claimants, like the accident victims in the MMA bankruptcy case, are
not going to stop appearing in chapter 11 bankruptcies. In fact, scholars predict
that tort claimants are going to appear more frequently in chapter 11 corporate
bankruptcies given the advantages of dealing with tort claims in bankruptcy.220
This trend is unfortunate because tort claimants are involuntary creditors. Their

216 See Darren Fishell, Assets of Bankrupt Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway Sold in Canada After
Clearing Regulatory Approval, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 30, 2014, 5:25 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/
2014/06/30/business/assets-of-bankrupt-montreal-maine-and-atlantic-railway-sold-in-canada-after-clearingregulatory-approval/ (stating MMA’s assets were sold for $15.85 million but the Quebec government has
claims against MMA in excess of $409 million for cleanup and other costs).
217 See Julie Gordon, Update 1-Victims of Quebec Oil-by-Rail Disaster Agree to $200 Mln Settlement,
REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2015, 7:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/10/canada-train-settlementidUSL1N0UO2KM20150110.
218 See Lac-Mégantic Rail Disaster: $200M Proposed Settlement Reached, CBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2015 7:29
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/lac-mégantic-rail-disaster-200m-proposed-settlement-reached1.2896250.
219 Motion of Official Committee of Victims Seeking Modification of Committee Appointment Order to
Authorize Committee to Fully Participate in Wrongful Death Proceedings Pending Before Maine District
Court at 1, In re Montreal Me. & Atl. Ry. Ltd., No. 13-10670 (Bankr. D. Me. Aug, 15, 2014), ECF No. 1077.
220 See Barbara J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 451–52 (1998)
(describing chapter 11 as a tool “to assist companies in bringing closure” to mass tort claims in bankruptcy).
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relationship with the debtor stems entirely from the fact that they are owed
money because the debtor has harmed them without their consent.
Luckily, the Code grants courts the power to form additional creditors’
committees for tort claimants. In determining whether additional creditors’
committees are needed in a case, courts balance the following factors: (1) the
nature of the case; (2) the ability of the existing creditors’ committee to
function; (3) the added cost of forming an additional creditors’ committee and
the timing of a creditor group’s motion requesting the court to form an
additional creditors’ committee; and (4) the desires of the constituencies.221
Balancing these factors strongly weighs in favor of forming a committee for
tort claimants.
Tort claimants will greatly benefit from having their own committee. The
committee of tort claimants will be able to work directly with the debtor to
formulate a reorganization plan or consult with the debtor about the terms of
the sale or other matters regarding the administration of the case.222 During this
process, tort claimants can voice their concerns about proposals that might not
be in their best interest. Moreover, because creditors’ committees can hire legal
counsel and other professionals,223 tort claimants will be informed about their
legal interests, and hence, better equipped to assert their legal interests in a
bankruptcy case. Finally, tort claimants will actually be able to voice their
concerns if they get their own committee because their voices will not be
drowned out by creditors who have dissimilar interests. Thus, while forming
creditors’ committees for tort claimants will not guarantee that tort claimants
will prevail on each of their objectives or will receive full repayment of their
claims, forming creditors’ committees for tort claimants is important because it
provides these victims a meaningful voice to advocate for their interests.
Moreover, we have seen that the failure to form creditors’ committees for tort
claimants can have disastrous results.224 Such a failure could enable corporate
debtors to sell their property free and clear of tort claims for such a low price
that tort claimants receive virtually nothing as evidenced in the General Motors

221 See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing In re Hill
Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 5–6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860–61 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987)), rev’d on other grounds, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Albero v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
222 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3) (2012).
223 Id. § 1103(a).
224 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Motion for Appointment, supra note 18, at 5 (describing tort victims as an
“economically fragile constituency”).
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and in the Chrysler bankruptcy cases.225 Thus, courts should always order the
United States Trustee to form creditors’ committees for tort claimants in
chapter 11 bankruptcies of corporate debtors.
CORINNE MCCARTHY∗

225 See In re General Motors, Inc., 407 B.R. 463, 473–74, 505 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); ‘New’ GM Agrees
to Assume Future Liability Claims of ‘Old’ GM Products, supra note 23. While the law is clear in this area, it
is not very sympathetic to tort claimants. The court in In re General Motors made this clear, stating,

This Court fully understands the circumstances of tort victims, and the fact that if they prevail in
litigation and cannot look to [the purchaser] as an additional source of recovery, they may
recover only modest amounts on any allowed claims . . . . But the law in this Circuit and District
is clear; the Court will permit [the debtor’s] assets to pass to the purchaser free and clear of
successor liability claims.
General Motors, Inc., 407 B.R. at 505.
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